Power Control Systems by implementing anomaly detection methods to identify attacks and faults. By using Rough Sets Classifi cation Algorithm, a set of rules can be defi ned. The alternative approach tries to reduce the number of input variables and the number of examples, offering a more compact set of examples to fi x the rules to the anomaly detection process. An illustrative example is presented.
I. Introduction to Critical Infrastructures
Presently, Critical Infrastructure plays a fundamental role in modern society. Telecommunication and transportation services, water and electricity supplies, and banking and fi nancial services are examples of infrastructures that provide critical services to our communities. The interconnection of these structures and the use of information technology (IT) to achieve service quality produce vulnerabilities and security threats. With a computer and an Internet connection, intruders can remotely access interconnected and interdependent Critical Infrastructures to interrupt important services. To safeguard against the threat of such cyber-attacks, providers of Critical Infrastructure services also need to maintain the accuracy, assurance and integrity of their interdependent data networks.
In [2] suggested dividing a Critical Infrastructure into the following three layers: the physical, cyber, and human operations layers. In the past, physical and human operations layers have been more vulnerable to attacks than the cyber layer. Currently, however, we are noting an increase in the vulnerability of the cyber layer as well.
II. Initiatives for Security of Critical Infrastructure
Guidance documents, standards, legislations, and regulations designed to improve the security of Critical Infrastructures are currently in development in many countries worldwide. The initiatives differ with respect to the involved parties and their goals, as well as geographic and industry scopes [3] . This section presents some of those initiatives.
Since September, 11, 2001 terrorism and homeland security have assumed top priority in US governmental policy and affairs. Examples can be found in the release of "The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace" [4] and with the official creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [5] . An initiative of the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETHZ) and other partners is "The International Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) Handbook" [3] that surveys critical information infrastructure protection efforts in fourteen countries. The main focus is on the national government efforts to protect Critical Information Infrastructures. The IT Baseline Protection Manual is a German initiative of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) that recommends a series of standard security measures for typical IT applications and IT systems [6] . There exist several written criteria for evaluating computer systems and software from a security perspective. These include the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), or the Orange book, the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), and the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE) or ISO/IEC 15408. Another security initiative is the "Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF)", which is an industry group working with security professionals to assess vulnerabilities and establish appropriate strategies for developing policies to reduce IT security risk within the US process control industry [7] . The ISA Committee SP99 "Manufacturing and Control Systems Security" intends to create guidance documents and a Standard (S99) for introducing IT security to existing industrial control and automation systems [8] . The objective for this IEC standard is to describe state-of-the-art secure realization of certain common automation networking scenarios [9] . The British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) maintains an Industrial Cyber Security Incident Database, designed to track cyber security incidences that affect industrial control systems and processes [10] .
III. Security Fundamentals
The security objectives offer a framework for categorizing and comparing the security mechanisms of various systems. These include Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authentication, Authorization, Auditability, Nonrepudiability, and Third-Party Protection. An intentional violation of a security objective is called an attack. Attacks may be initiated either by persons on the outside, or by insiders. Some common types of attacks include Denial of Service, Eavesdropping, Spoofing, Man-in-the-Middle, Breaking into system, Virus, Trojan, and Worm [11] . Naedele and Dzung [12] enumerated a relationship between the security objective and the security mechanism.
McHugh et al. [13] illustrated how the increasing sophistication of attacks from the mid1980s to the present have grown in complexity and automation despite the fact that the skill level required to launch the attacks has been reduced. This is an indication that automation may be the trigger for large-scale activity on the Internet.
IV. Electric Energy Critical Infrastructure
The Electric Utility Information Technology Systems can be divided into four basic categories: Business Computers, Engineering Computers, Control Centre Computers, and Embedded Computers [14] . The use of IT in the Control Centre Computers and Embedded Computers began approximately three decades ago. The operational structure used for IT is based on a data validation/conformation process to the supervisory and control system. This process is realized in three steps: Data Acquisition, Data Conditioning, and Data Conversion. Subsequently the data is inserted into the control and/or supervisory computer, where the specific treatment is accomplished and the requisite actions are undertaken to maintain the behaviour and reliability of the system (Fig. 1) .
In general, an Electricity Cyber Infrastructure is highly interconnected and dynamic, consisting of several utilities. Due to its hierarchical organization, the Electricity Cyber Infrastructure is sub-divided into regional grids. Each sector is further split into generation, transmission, distribution, and customer service systems, supplemented with an energy trading system. The Power Grid is comprised of a myriad assets, such as Generation Plants, Transmission Lines, Transmission and Distribution Power Substations, Local, Regional and National Control Centres, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)/Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), and Communication Links [15] .
The computer electricity cyber infrastructure can be divided in 2 components: Electric Management Systems, which allow operators to regulate power flow, and the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for monitoring the safety, reliability, and protective functions of the power grid [15] . See Fig. 2 .
V. Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
Presently, SCADA systems are an important part of the Nation's Critical Infrastructure. They require protection from a variety of threats and their network is potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks because the proprietary protocols and networks have long been considered immune to attacks. Moreover, they have not been designed with security in mind. The diversity and lack of interoperability in these communication protocols create obstacles for anyone attempting to establish a secure communication. The variety of communications media used to establish the communication links contributes to the observed increase in the infrastructure vulnerability [16] .
VI. Detecting Attacks
Attacks on computer and network systems have significantly increased in recent years [12] . An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a "burglar alarm" that has been studied widely in recent years [17] [18] [19] [20] . Mé et al. [21] wrote an extended bibliography on IDS. IDSs can be characterized by different monitoring and analysis approaches. They can monitor events at three different levels: network, host, and application. These events can be analyzed using two techniques, namely signature detection and anomaly detection. Anomaly-based IDSs discover attacks by identifying unusual behaviour (anomalies) on a host or network. They function on the observation that some attackers behave differently than "normal" users and thus can be detected by systems that identify these differences. The measures and techniques used in anomaly detection include: Threshold Detection, Statistical Measures, and Rule-based Measures [19] . Examples of anomaly detection techniques are IDES [22] and EMERALD [23] .
VII. Previous Work
Different approaches have been used for detecting intrusions in computer systems over the past 20 years. Most of the previous work on anomaly intrusion detection has determined profiles for user behaviour. Intrusions are detected when a user behaves out of character. These anomalies are detected using statistical profiles, as in IDES [22] , inductive pattern generation, or neural networks [24, 35] . Manikopoulos and Papavassiliou [26] used statistical models and metrics derived from observations of the user's actions. Fink et al. [27] focused on determining normal behaviour for privileged process; those that run as root. Another approach taken from Forest et al. [24] is similar to the latter but differs in that it uses a much simpler representation of normal behaviour. Anomaly detection schemes also utilize data mining techniques such as clustering, support vector machines (SVM), and different neural network models. For example, Mukamala [28] describes approaches to intrusion detection using neural networks and SVM. Sekar et al. [29] presented an approach that combines specification-and anomaly-based intrusion detection, mitigating the weaknesses of the two approaches while magnifying their strengths. Sarasamma et al. [30] introduced a novel multilevel hierarchical Kohonenen Net (K-Map), whereby each level of the Hierarchical Map is modeled as a simple winner-take-all K-Map. Their objective was to detect as many different types of attacks as possible. Xiangyang et al. [31] presented a data mining algorithm based on supervised clustering to learn patterns and use them for data classification. Yu et al. [32] presented research results on detecting network security attacks in computer and control systems by identifying and monitoring a synthetic "DNA Sequence". Just as DNA comprises the building blocks for establishing the human body, a "DNA Sequence" for a computer system has similar functions. Changes in behavioural patterns of a computer system, such as virus attacks, are reflected in changes in the synthetic DNA Sequence, suggesting appropriate actions can be taken. Martinelli et al. [33] proposed an approach to monitor and protect the Electric Power System by learning normal system behaviour at a substation level, and raising an alarm signal when an abnormal status is detected; the problem was addressed by using auto-associative neural networks, reading substation measures. Wang et Battiti [34] proposed a real-time network-based intrusion identification model founded by principal components analysis (PCA). The PCA technique is used to profile normal program and user behaviours for hostbased anomaly intrusion detection. Song et al. [35] introduces the Hierarchical Random Subset Selection-Dynamic Subset Selection (RSS-DSS) algorithm for dynamically filtering large data sets based on the concepts of training pattern age and difficulty, while utilizing a data structure to facilitate the efficient use of memory hierarchies. Bigham et al. [36] showed how the accuracy and security of SCADA Systems can be improved by using anomaly detection to identify bad values caused by attacks and faults. In their work, they compare the performances of invariant induction and n-gram anomaly-detectors.
VII. Problem Definition
The operation of a power system is intrinsically complex due to the high degree of uncertainty and the large number of variables involved. The various supervision and control actions require the presence of an operator, who must respond efficiently to the most diverse requests, by handling various types of data and information.
These data and information come from measurements of SCADA systems or from computational processes. The size of the current database in a power control center has increased tremendously over the past few years due to the use of network communications, which renders their control systems more vulnerable to manipulation by malicious intruders. In order to improve the security of SCADA systems, anomaly detection can be used to identify corrupted values caused by malicious attacks and faults.
The aim of this paper is to present an alternative technique for implementing anomaly detection to monitor Power Electric Systems. The problem is addressed here by using Rough Sets Classification Algorithm, proposed by Pawlak et al. [37] . Related work can also be found [2, 33, 36, 38, 39] .
The system operator must be apprised of the current state of the system and some forecasted position, such as load forecasting, maintenance scheduling, in order to take a control action (switching, changing taps, and voltage levels). One of the most important operator tasks is to determine the current operational state of the system. To accomplish this task, the operator receives many data from/into the system. By handling these data, the operator attempts to build an image of the operation point. Figure 3 illustrates this process.
The analysis attempts to assess the operational mode in one of the 2 states: normal, or abnormal. In the first state, normal, all loads are supplied and all measurements are inside the nominal rates. In the second state, abnormal, all loads continue to be supplied, but some of the measurements are outside the nominal rates or some loads are not supplied (i.e., there was a load shedding process).
The operator must regularly analyze the system security, even when the operation state is normal. This analysis is conducted according to possible contingencies that could affect the power system. The loss of a transmission line, shut-down of a power plant or an increase in the load are some contingencies that can occur during the operation. An example of normal or abnormal points is shown in Figure 3 , which illustrates the same contingency for two different operation points. For operation point A, the contingency produces an abnormal operation point; while for the operation point B, the system continues in the normal state. Thus, point A is an unsafe operation position and point B is a safe one. The illustrative example that follows has an objective to describe the fundamental concepts of the rough set theory applied to anomaly detection. The idea is to transform a set of examples in a set of rules that identify possible intruders. For the sake of explanation, we have made some assumptions and reductions. This approach gives us the opportunity to detail each step of the formulation without reducing generalization.
IX. Description of the Problem
The main purpose of the illustrative example that follows is to enable an understanding of the rough set theory fundamental concepts. The idea is to transform a set of examples in a set of rules that represent the operational state of a power system. The data used in this paper comes from a Brazilian electricity utility.
Consider a control center database composed by a set of measurements, such as that shown in Table I . The operational state of the hypothetical power system depends on four elements: status of circuit-breaker A, transmission capacity of lines B and C, and voltage of bus D. Moreover, Table 1 The classifications of the states are made according to the advice of an expert (usually, a senior operator/engineer). And four possible outputs can be selected for the power system operational state: Normal or safe (S) or abnormal or unsafe levels 1, 2 and 3 (L1, L2, and L3, respectively). These levels can represent malicious actions in SCADA systems performed by the attackers such as changing data values, changing information control, opening breakers, fraud, and overload. Observing the above set of examples, we find it difficult to conclude that the condition of transmission line B is unnecessary to the classification process. Notice that this attribute is a dispensable one, as shown later. Even in this very small database it is difficult to reach a conclusion. For a real control center database, typically representing hundreds of important attributes and thousands of examples, obtaining a reliable control action might be impossible.
X. Presentation of the Algorithm
Before presenting the algorithm, two major concepts in the Rough Set theory, reduct and core, must be defined. These concepts are important in the knowledge of base reduction.
Let R be a family of equivalence relations. The reduct of R, RED(R), is defined as a reduced set of relations that conserve the same inductive classification of set R. The core of R, CORE(R), is the set of relations that appear in all reduct of R (i.e., the set of all indispensable relations to characterize the relation R). The main idea behind the knowledge base reduction is a simplification of a set of examples. This can be obtained by the following procedure: a) Calculate the core of the problem; b) Eliminate or substitute a variable by another one; and c) Redefine the problem using new basic categories.
The algorithm that provides the reduction of conditions can be represented by the following steps:
Step 1: Redefine the value of each attribute according to a certain metric. In this illustrative example, typical ranges in the power system operation are used: because the values 0 and 1 were normalized previously.
Step 2: This next step verifies whether any attribute can be eliminated by repetition.
Step 3: This step verifies and eliminates identical examples.
Step 4: This step verifies whether the decision table contains only indispensable attributes. This verification task can be accomplished by eliminating step-by-step each attribute and verifying whether the table still provides the correct classification. In the example below, after considering the elimination of each attribute, we concluded that B is a dispensable variable from the decision table.
TABLE II Reduction of the Set of Examples
Step 5: Compute the core of the set of examples. This can be done by eliminating each attribute step-by-step, and verifying whether the decision table continues to provide the correct answer (i.e., continues to be consistent).
Step 6: This step computes the reduced set of relations that conserve the same inductive classification of the original set of examples. Table 2 contains the reduction of each example.
Step 7: According to Table II , the knowledge that exists in Table I can be expressed by the following set of rules: or, using a complete rule formulation:
If (the power flow in transmission line C is between 40% and 60%) and (the voltage on bus D is below 1.05), then the classification of the current state of the system is safe.
If the power flow in transmission line C is below 40%, then the classification of the current state of the system is unsafe level 1.
If (the voltage on bus D is above 1.05) and (the circuit-breaker A is closed or the power flow in transmission line C is between 40% and 60%), then the classification of the current state of the system is unsafe level 2.
If (the power flow in transmission line C is above 60%) and (the circuit-breaker A is closed), then the classification of the current state of the system is unsafe level 2.
If (the circuit-breaker A is opened), then the classification of the current state of the system is unsafe level 3.
If (the power flow in transmission line C is above 60%) and (the voltage on bus D is between 0.95 and 1.05), then the classification of the current state of the system is unsafe level 3.
XI. Future Work
To compare the methodology proposed herein to the results obtained in other similar works, such as those performed by Martinelli [33] and Bigham [36] , we will conduct experimental tests using the Test Data for Anomaly Detection in the Electricity Infrastructure proposed by Bigham et al. [40] . This is a large set of electricity data for the IEEE 24 bus system generated on a test bed that copies the cyber layer of the electricity infrastructure in some detail. These data have been filtered and corrupted with natural noise and a realistic set of failure-induced and attack-induced corruption. The next step will be applying the proposed methodology to obtain the set of rules for normal and non-normal data values.
XII. Conclusions
Critical Infrastructures, such Electric Power Systems, are vital for our modern society. Therefore they require protection from a variety of threats, and their network is potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks. The Intrusion Detection System is an important tool to increase the security of such Critical Infrastructures. This paper presents a systematic approach to transforming examples in a reduced set of rules for anomaly detection using Rough Set Theory and concepts of Core and Reduction of Knowledge. An example for power system control centers has been developed. For the sake of clarity, a reduced database is used in the illustrative example. However, the same methodology is applicable to larger databases. The illustrative example demonstrated that this technique has many advantages, such as simplicity of implementation and favorable performance. 
